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FISCAL FEDERALISM AND OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREAS:
EVIDENCE FOR EUROPE FROM THE UNITED STATES
ABSTRACT
Themaingoalof this paper is to estimateto what extent the
federalgovernment of the United States insures member states against
regional income shocks. We find that a one dollar reduction in a
region's per capita personal income triggers a decrease in federal
taxes of about 34 cents and an increase in federal transfers of about
6 cents. Hence, the final reduction in disposable per capita income
is on the order of 60 cents. That is, between one third and one half
of the initial shock is absorbed by the federal government.
The much larger reaction of taxes than transfers to these
regional imbalances reflects the fact that the main mechanism at work
is the federal income tax system which in turn means that the
stabilization process is automatic rather than specifically designed
each time there is a cyclical movement in income.
Some economists may want to argue that this regional insurance
scheme provided by the federal government is an important reason why
the system of fixed exchange rates that exists within the United
States today has survived without major problems. Under this view,
the creation of a European Central Bank that issues unified european
currency without the simultaneous introduction (or expansion) of a
fiscal federalist system could put the project at risk.
Rough calculations of the impact of the existing european tax
system on regional income suggests that a one dollar shock to regional
GDP will reduce tax payments to the EEC government by half a centL
Hence, the current European tax system has a long way to go before it
reaches the 34 cents of the U.S. Federal Government.
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and NBER and NBER(1) INTRODUCTION
Some Background
The issue of the appropriate exchange rate (ER) system for Europe is now
hotly debated.Yet the question of whether Europe should have a single
currency is not new, It goes back to the very first debates surrounding
European economic integration of the late 40's and the50's1. From the very
beginning people have asked what, in our opinion, is a central question: Why
doER problems seem not to exist within some subsets of countries or within a
country with a diversity of regions (as, for instance, the United States),
while they do exist in the world as a whole? Put differently, why has the
"irrevocably fixed" ER system within the US functioned well, while the Cold
Standard and the Bretton Woods systems collapsed?.Economists have phrased
this question in the following way: what constitutes an optimum (or at least
reasonably good) currency area?2.
Different schools have answered this question differently. Classical
economists argued that the key variable to exchange rate regimes is
transactions costs. Because these transactions costs represent social
losses, they should be minimized and the way to do it is to have a single
worldwide currency. Thus the entire world is an optimum currency area. J.
S. Mill puts it in a very illustrative way:
"...So much of barbarism, however, still remainsin the transactions of
most civilizednations, that almost all independent countries choose to
assert their nationality by having, to their owninconvenienceand that of
their neighbors, a peculiar currency of their own."3
Of course, in order to explain the existence of different currencies
Mill had to claim a kind of "barbarism", a view that is not shared by many of
his XXth century followers. The New Classical economists claim that one has
to weigh the costs of having heterogeneous currencies with the benefits of
being of each country being able to achieve its ownoptimalrate of money
growth. Because they view the process of money supply as essentially a tax
1on existing money holdings, they see no reason why money growth (or
inflation) should not be viewed within the problem of optimal taxation for
each country.Hence, they explain the existence of different currencies
according to structural differences across countries that lead to different
optimal tax rates. For instance, it has been argued that the private
technology for evading income taxes in Italy is superior to the one in
Germany so the optimal inflation tax in Italy may be larger than in Germany.
Thus the two countries should enjoy different currencies. See for instance
Canzoneri and Rogers (1990).
Another view, associated with Monetarist and Keynesian economists puts
the money supply process (and therefore the exchange rate regime) in the
context of stabilization policies.Mundell (1961)argued that only regions
within which there is relatively high labor mobility should have a unique
currency4. His (now canonical) example is the following:suppose we have
two regions (A and B), each producing one good (a and b respectively) and
populated by households who consume a little bit of both goods so that there
is interregional trade. Suppose that, starting from a full employment
equilibrium position, there is a permanent shift of preferences from good a
to good b (ie, at initial relative prices, everybody prefers relatively more
of good b and less a). If the relative price between the two goods (the real
ER) does not change, there will be a trade imbalance (a deficit for A and a
surplus for B). Equilibrium can be restored at the initial relative price by
changing the supplied quantities of both a and b.This can be achieved by
moving people from region A to region B.
Yet another way to restore equilibrium is by changing the relative price
and maintaining the initial quantities.In turn, this can be done through
two different channels: the first one involves changing the nominal exchange
rate and leaving the nominal prices in the two regions unchanged. This
possibility is not present, however, when both regions have the same
currency.The second way of moving the real ER is to change the nominal
prices levels. In the case we are considering, the price level in A has to
go down relative to the one in B.If prices and wages adjust immediately,
the real ER jumps to the new equilibrium level and that is the end of the
story. But the economists that support these stories believe that price
levels are "sticky" (possibly due to small menu costs).In this case, the
new equilibrium real ER will slowly be reached but only after a period of
2"over employment" in B and deflation and unemployment inA5. The longer it
takes the nominal prices to adjust, the more severe will be the recession in
A.Hence, according to this view, if labor is not highly mobile, A and B
should have flexible ER so the monetary authorities can stabilize the two
regions' output through independent monetarypolicies6.Thus, as mentioned
earlier, this view holds that only regions within which there is high labor
mobility should have flexible exchange rate systems.
Should Europe have a unique currency?. The Keynesian answer, according
to what we just have seen, depends importantly on whether the EEC is strongly
affected by the type of "real" shocks we just described or rather by
"monetary shocks" like changes in the demand formoney7. If we conclude that
real shocks are important, then we have to analyze factor mobility among
regions (or sectors). The 1992 liberalization will abolish all major
constraints in labor mobility so in principle there seems to be a good reason
to substitute all individual currencies for a single one. But there are
barriers other (and perhaps more important) than the legal ones. Europeans
have very different cultures and languages, as well as important and well
known imperfections in housing markets that stifle mobility even within
countries, not to mention between countries. These barriers will still exist
after 1992.Hence, under this Keynesian view, if Europe decides to have a
common currency, interregional shocks will generate unemployment in some
regions and inflation in some others.The very survival of the monetary
union (and, with it, the political and other forms of unification) could be
threatened8.
But let us imagine that, for whatever reason, Europeans go ahead and fix
their exchange rates forever by creating a unique european currency. What
can be done to minimize the possibility of collapse?. This can be answered
by analyzing the regions of the United States. One could think ofthe U.S.
as a collection of regions or states linked by a system of irrevocablyfixed
exchange rates.And one can argue that this system has worked reasonably
well over the last couple hundred years. The question is what did it take?.
The first thing to understand is that, even though one might be tempted
to think that there are no major interregional shocks requiring large changes
in the real exchange rate across regions of the U.S., this is simply not
true.What is true is that, because there are no current account data,
policymakers and journalists do not associate these situationswith open
3economy problems that require large real exchange rate movements. The second
point is that, contrary to most people's beliefs, labor mobility across the
United States is fairly limited. In a related study Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(l991a) found that, caeteris paribus, an increase in a state per capita
personal income by 1% raises net in-migration only by enough to raise the
state's population growth rate by .026% per year. This slow adjustment
through net migration means that population densities do not adjust rapidly
to differences in per capita income adjusted for amenities.
Fiscal Federalism and Exchange Rates
It has been argued that one of the reasons why the U.S. exchange rate
system has held up reasonably well is the existence of a "Federal Fiscal
Authority" which insures states against regional shocks9. In addition to the
mechanisms already mentioned (devaluation, labor movements or recession),
there is another way of maintaining a fixed parity without major real
imbalances: having a redistribution of income from "adversely shocked" to
"favorably shocked" regions10. After a permanent taste shock like the one
proposed by Mundell, we can be closer to full employment without changing the
nominal ER or the nominal prices if we tax region B sufficiently and give the
proceeds to region A (or reduce tax in A). This will, under some reasonable
assumptions about relative demands increase demand for good "a" and reduce
demand for "b" at the initial relative prices. The tax and transfer policy
will mitigate (although not completely eliminate) the initial regional
imbalance.
We should note at this point that this interregional public insurance
scheme does not even need to be "conscious": a proportional income tax even
if accompanied by acyclical expenditures and transfers will automatically
work as a tax/transfer system that helps to defend fixed ER parities. Even
better, if (as we will see it is the case in the United States) the income
tax is progressive and the transfer system is countercyclical, the fraction
of the shocks insured by the fiscal system will be even larger.
In addition to this automatic insurance scheme, the Federal government
could have other tools in order to be able to stabilize large nonstationary
shocks such as the S&L crises in the United States or the German unification
shock in Europe.
4There is set of questions that immediately comes to mind:
(i) Couldn't the regional government stabilize output by running
countercyclical deficits?
Regional governments (e.g. states within the United States) could try to
stabilize regional income by themselves, running budget deficits during
regional recessions and surpluses during booms, hut such a policy is likely
to be much less effective than a federal arrangement. The problem with
regional fiscal policy is that budget deficits have to be repaid by higher
taxes or lower spending by the same region at some point in the future.
Short-term gains in stabilization may be lost in the future, or even worse,
short-run stabilization could be frustrated by Ricardian equivalence if the
future taxes are incorporated into consumers' budget constraints. This
Ricardian equivalence does not, however, frustrate stabilization when the
fiscal policy is carried out by a federal authority, because in that case,
the federal arrangement explicitly redistributes the intertemporal tax and
spending patterns across regions according to the shocks hitting the regional
economies.Lower taxes paid by a region in recession are NOT matched in
present value terms by higher future taxes paid by the same region, but
rather by higher taxes paid by all regions in the federal area.
Another reason why state and regional governments Cannot really smooth
income with countercyclical deficits is that, to the extent that factors of
production are mobile, they may tend to remain in the state while taxes are
low and leave when taxes increase. In other words, when regional governments
run large deficits, firms and workers expect future tax increases. Of course
that means that they will both tend to leave the region at the time of the
tax increases, which will reduce the regional government tax base. Because
state governments may fear this reaction, they will choose not to run large
state deficits, which substantially reduces the potential role for income
smoothing regional deficits. Recent history shows that regional governments
(both in the United States and in Europe) may already be in financial
trouble, so further deficits seem like infeasible strategies at this point
(see the paper by Goldstein and Woglom in this volume for evidence on this
issue)
5(ii)Isn't this insurance scheme infeasible in Europe because the
richer countries are already complaining about more redistributional policies
to help the South?.
No. This paper does not ask whether the Federal Fiscal System actually
promotes long run income equality11. One may want to argue that a Federal
Government is needed to reduce long run income inequalities through taxes and
transfers. But this is not the purpose of the present study and our findings
have nothing to do with whether the federal government has other programs to
reduce the long run dispersion of per capita income. In other words, in the
federal insurance scheme, the rich countries would not have to pay more than
the poor countries.
As an example, let us imagine two countries: R (rich) and P (poor) who
decide to create a federal union,Imagine that the rich country has an
income of 1000 Ecus and the poor has an income of 500 Ecus.Suppose that
they decide to pay an income tax of 10% to the central government. The
government will from then on give a transfer of lOOEcus a year to R and a
transfer of SOEcus to P.Note that in the first year there are no net
transfers so this program is not designed to redistribute income from Rich to
Poor.
Let us imagine that during the following year R suffers an adverse shock
that reduces its income by l00Ecus while P sees its income increased by
lOOEcus. The taxes paid to the Federal Government would still be 10% of
income so R would pay 9OEcus and P 6OEcus. The transfers received from the
central government would still be 100 and 5OEcus respectively. In effect,
therefore, there would be a transfer from R to P by the amount of lOEcus. In
other words, the Federal insurance scheme redistributes income from the
country that suffers a favorable shock to the country that suffers an adverse
shock, regardless of whether they happen to be Rich or Poort. In particular,
it is independent of any other programs the federal governments may want to
implement in order to reduce income inequality in the long run.
(iii) Couldn't private insurance markets do the same job?
In principle it is true that an auto worker in Detroit can write a
contract with an economics professor in Massachusetts that insures
6eachother's wage against interregional shocks. The problem with this
argument is that, due to the practical difficultiesin monitoring the wages
from people living thousands of miles away, these type of contracts are
subject to moral hazard and adverse selection problemsthat will in practice
prevent them fromexisting12. It is shown in Sala-i-Kartin (1990) that state
GDP and GNP behave very similarly over the periods for which both data are
available (which includes the sample considered in the empirical section of
this paper). If these contracts were important, the behavior of CDP and CNP
would be very different.
The main goal of this paper is to find out empirically how important is
this insurance role of the Federal Fiscal system across the United States'
regions.The rest of the paper is organized as follows.In section 2 we
highlight the empirical method used. In section 3 we describethe data.In
section 4 we report the main empirical results. In section 5 we quantify the
importance of the empirical findings. The last sectionconcludes.
(2) BASIC METHOD
Our goal is to find by how many cents the disposable income of region i
falls when there is a one dollar adverse shock to that region's income,and
when the region belongs to a federal fiscal union. That is we want to see
(2.1) t.YD —tY+TR-TX
where disposable income -YD-isdefined as the sum of GDP -Y-plus
transfers from a federal government -TR-,minustaxes paid to that federal
government -TX-,withall of the variables to be thought of as discounted
present values (note that Y in (2.1) involves only current outputhowever):
Suppose that the tax and transfer system works so thateach 1 percent
increase in Y produces a TX percent increase in taxes to thefederal
government, and a percent decrease in transfers to thefederal
government. In other words,
TX/TX ETR/TR
(2.2) TX — andTR —tY/Y






TR*TR/Y). Procyclical taxes (flTx>O)and
countercyclical transfers (PTR<O) stabilize disposable income in the face of
external shocks.
Our empirical strategy will be to estimate the two key elasticities
and TR using United States state or regional data.The U.S. is a good
laboratory because it consists of several economically distinct regions,
linked together by a Federal Covernment and using an "irrevocably fixed ER
system". We will divide the United States into nine census regions and try
to estimate their federal tax and transfers elasticities (ie their TX and
TR coefficients).We choose the nine census regions for two convenient
reasons.First, the size of the individual regions is then similar to the
average size of a member of the European Community. Second, the division we
choose is made by the Bureau of the Census to define census region. Thus, we
cannot be accused of constructing the regions so as to fit the data better.
One could argue that an even more natural unit is the "state" because states
have independent fiscal units (state governments).This is true but since
the ultimate goal of this paper is to apply the results to the European
community, the U.S. map with fifty states would look too different from the
European one13.The Regions (as defined by the Bureau of the Census) are
described in Table 1.To calculate the coefficients TX andTR' we will
think about the following empirical implementation (which builds on






whereTAX refers to real tax revenue per capita, INCOME is real income per
capita and TRANSFER is real value of transfers per capita. The TIME variable
reflects upward/downward trends in relative taxes that are not explained by
the relative variations in income. Long term movements in stuff which is not
cyclically correlated with relative income.
8The straight implementation of this two equations involves at least
three problems. First, we may encounter simultaneity biases. Since higher
taxes may depress regional economic activity, simple least squares estimates
of equation (2.4) will have a downward bias, If we think of taxes as being
lump sum, an increase in Federal taxes will reduce disposable income and,
therefore, aggregate expenditure and output.We should mention here that
this is true even if Ricardian Equivalence in the Barro (1974) sense holds.
This is true because people in region A may think that the higher tax rates
they are paying now may be used to finance lower taxes in some other regions
either now or in the future.Hence, their current human wealth falls with
tax increases, Of course we could think of this as being the "space
dimension version" of Blanchard (1985): in his model, people think they can
shift taxes to future yet unborn generations for which they do not really
care about. Here agents think they can shift taxes to people of other regions
for which they do not really care about either.The discount rates that
Blanchard interprets as probability of death can be interpreted here as the
"probability of my taxes being paid by the people of some other state". If,
more realistically, taxes are distortionary rather than lump sum, there will
be additional negative effects on income of a rise in taxes, such as the
disincentive of labor supply and investment.
The same type of arguments apply to transfers. Suppose that a decline
in activity leads to a rise in transfers, through countercyclical spending
programs such as unemployment insurance. If we try to estimate this negative
relationship between economic activity and transfers,the estimated
coefficient on economic activity will tend to be biased towards zero, since
higher lump sum federal transfers will caeteris paribus tend to increase
disposable income and consumption and therefore increase activity in the
region.We will try to solve this simultaneity problem by instrumental
variables estimation.
The second problem we may encounter is that of endogenous U.S. budget
deficits. One can argue that when the overall U.S. suffers a recession, the
Federal Government runs a deficit (maybe because optimal tax rates are
smooth).If tax rates remain constant and transfers increase or remain
constant, the federal government absorbs some of the initial shock.Barro
(1979) finds that a one dollar shock to U.S. income generates an increase in
the federal deficit of about 1.8 dollars. In order to make sure that we are
9not picking up these Federal Deficit effects, we want to see how the Federal
taxes and transfers for a specific region change when the region's income
changes by 1% relative to the rest of the nation. That is, we will estimate
changes in regional taxes and transfers holding the overall US CNP, taxes and
transfers constant. The two modified equations will therefore be the
following:
(2.4)' ln(RELATIVE TAXi) —°TX
+TXln(RELATIVE INCOME1) +y,TIME
+u
(2.5)' ln(REL. TRANSFER1) —TR
+TRln(RELAT. INCOME1) +7TRTIME+
whererelative X refers to the ratio of state i's X to the overall U.S. value
of X (where X is either tax revenue, transfers or personal income).Since
the relevant variables are now in relative terms, the coefficients and
TR tell us by what percentage the region's taxes and transfers change
(relative to the rest of the country federal taxes and transfers) when its
income changes by 1% holding constant the changes in U.S. aggregate income.
The third empirical problem we have to deal with involves the error
terms.Even though we will start by estimating (2.4)' and (2.5)' with
standard ordinary least squares, there is no a priori reason to assume that
the error terms are homoscedastic or that they are uncorrelated across
regions.Therefore we will estimate the systems of equations allowing for
correlation across equations and also allowing for the regional shocks to
have different variances in different regions.
(3) DATA
The data we use are available by state. We aggregate them according to
the Bureau of the Census regional definitions which are reported in Table 1.
The personal income data are net of transfers or taxes and are taken from the
Survey of Current Business (SCE). To calculate income per capita we use the
population data reported by the SCB.
The lack of a regional or state consumer price index forces us to deflate
regional variables by the overall U.S. CPI.This could potentially be a
problem if there were large regional prices movements,Of course we know
that the relative prices will not change in response to nominal or monetary
shocks. We tend to think, however, that the response to real shocks (such as
10productivity changes or consumer preferences shifts) involve changes in
relative prices. Internal migration could also have effects on relative
prices mostly through changes in the prices of nontradeables (the most
important item of which is probably housing).Given that the data, to the
best of our knowledge, do not exist, the best we can do for now is to use
aggregate U.S. price data (consumer price index) and hope that these errors
are not very large. Sala-i-Martin (1990, Chapter 3) uses city price data for
over 30 SMAS to show that these errors are probably very small since the
largest inflation differential between any two cities is almost 9% over the
last 60 years (which corresponds to an annual inflation differential of about
.14%).
Thus, regional nominal income per capita is deflated by U.S. CPI to
create real income per capita. The relative real income per capita data is
the ratio of a region's real income per capita to the overall U.S. real
income per capita.
The tax variable includes Personal Tax and Non Tax payments to the
Federal government as reported by the SCB (which includes individual and
fiduciary income taxes, estate and gift taxes and nonpayment taxes) plus
contributions to social insurance.Of course these are not all the taxes
collected by the Federal Government: in particular we are missing corporate
taxes (which, if include Federal Reserve Banks, amounted about 10% of total
federal receipts in 1986) and indirect taxes and customs duties (which
amounted about 6% of total federal receipts in 1986). The reason why we are
omitting these tax receipts is that the data are not available at a state
level (The Tax Foundation in Washington started collecting these kind of data
in 1981 so we could not find state-disaggregated federal tax receipts before
that date).Since we are missing only 17% of the total, we think that our
estimates would not change much if the missing taxes were included14.
We deflate the tax data with the U.S. CPI and we divide by population to
calculate real federal tax payments per capita. Again we divide the regional
variable by the U.S. variable to get relative real federal tax payments per
capita.
Total nominal transfers from the Federal Government to the State (or
region).It is the sum of direct transfers to individuals (as reported by
the SCB) plus Federal transfers to State and Local governments. The direct
transfer payments to individuals include social security and other retirement
11plans, income maintenance payments (food stamps, supplementary secondary
income for aged and disabled and others), veteran benefits payments and
payments to nonprofit institutions. Notice that unemployment benefits are not
directly included here since unemployment programs are not run by the Federal
but, rather, by the state governments (although they are indirectly included
there to the extent that the Federal Government increases its transfers to
the State Government when the state suffers high unemployment). The reason
we include Transfers to State and Local governments is that Federal help to
region A after a negative shock may involve direct transfers to state and
local governments which then either decrease taxes or increase transfers to
the private sector (as is the case with unemployment benefits).
A more comprehensive measure of "federal fiscal help" would include
government purchases and project awards. We do not include them in our study
for two reasons. First, we did not find time series data on Federal
purchases by state long enough to match our sample. The Tax Foundation
collects these data since 1981. But the data do not exist before then.
Second, these data correspond to "contracts" not to actual expenditure: The
final site of the supercollider will be Texas but this does not mean that all
the money will be spent there. Scientists from Massachusetts, workers from
Seattle and financial lizards from New York could very well benefit from the
money awarded to Texas. Hence, for our purposes, these data are not that
useful after all.
There are also other kinds of important transfer payments that are not
included in our study up to this point.The federal government transfers
involved in shutting down the failed savings and loan institutions would not
be picked up the categories of transfer payments we are using, and yet the
size of the transfers involved are very large.As an illustration, as of
mid-1988, there were 127 FSLIC-insured thrift institutions in Texas with a
negative net worth (according to so-called GAAP accounting rules). These
institutions had a combined negative net worth of about $151 billion, or
about 60 percent of the state's GNP!If Texas were an independent country,
these bank failures would produce an extreme financial crisis that would
cripple the Texas economy, a large decline in net wealth, and perhaps a
significant external debt crisis, to the extent that deposits in the failed
institutions were from outside of Texas. Instead, the crisis will produce,
at much lower cost, an enormous transfer of income to Texas from the rest of
12the United States.
We will deflate the transfer data with the U.S. CPI and we will divide by
population to calculate real federal transfer receipts per capita. Again we
will divide the regional variable by the U.S. variable to get relative real
federal transfer receipts per capita.
(4) ESTIMATION
Instruments Regressions.
As mentioned earlier, the systems (2.4)' and (2.5)' are subject to
simultaneity bias problems. To solve this potential problem we will try to
find instruments.Candidates for instruments are aggregate variables that
may affect different regions in different ways due to the different
production structures, etc.
Our list of proposed instruments includes the real price of oil (ROILP),
US aggregate GNP growth (DCNP), and the real value of the US DOLLAR. Since
regionsdiffer markedly intheir naturalendowmentsand product
specialization, one may think that changes in the relative price of oil will
affects regions differently. The aggregate growth variable is included on
the grounds that different regions will have industrial mixes with different
sensitivities to economy-wide business cycle conditions (e.g. services are
less cyclical than heavy industry). The real value of the dollar vis-a-vis a
basket of foreign currencies is included because different regions have a
different mix of tradeables versus nontradeables, and thus will be
differentially affected by the extent to which the dollar fluctuates in value
versus foreign currencies.There is no good reason to think that these
aggregate shocks affect relative taxes and transfers through some channel
other than relative income changes.So, in principle, they should be good
instruments so long as they are correlated with initial income.
In Table 2 we show how well these proposed instruments correlate with
relative income. We see that the regressions are highly successful for 8 out
of the 9 regions. The exception is the Pacific region (PAC) with an adjusted
R2 coefficient of about .35.The other regions' R2 range from .65 in WNCto
.92 in ENC. We can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero for
all regions at a 1% significance level (5% for PAC).
13Some of the partial correlations In Table 2 are interesting. We observe
that relative income for NENG is significantly positively correlated with the
real value of the dollar (DOLLAR) and negatively correlated with the real
price of oil (ROILP), which reflects the negative wealth effect mentioned
above. We also see that when the U.S. grows faster, New England's relative
income goes down.The Middle Atlantic region is very similar to NENG. It
does very well when the dollar is strong and relatively poorly when oil
prices rise. MAIL also does poorly when the US as a whole grows faster. The
long run trend In its relative income is positive.
South Atlantic's relative income is also positively correlated with the
DOLLAR and negatively correlated with ROILP and DGNP. This later variable,
however, is not significant. The long run trend is positive. East North
Central is a very interesting region. Its relative income is very negatively
correlated with the DOLLAR and the ROILP. This region is a major producer of
industrial goods (cars) and it is hurt by foreign imports when the dollar is
strong. It is also hurt by higher oil prices (as oil is a complementary good
for cars). Different from all the above regions, ENC does relatively well
when the US as a whole grows faster. The long run trend is negative.
East South Central's relative income seems not to be affected by the
real oil price (its coefficient is negative but insignificant). This region
is hurt in relative terms by a strong dollar and by a weak US growth. Its
Long Run trend is significantly negative.West North Central presents a
negative trend and significant relative correlation with the dollar. Its
income barely moves when the US GNP growth or the oil price change. West
South Central income is very strongly and positively correlated with the real
oil price. Given that the states in this region are major producers of oil,
this is not surprising. Even though none of the other instruments is
significant the remarkable fit (R2 of .79) shows that this region's relative
income is largely determined by oil prices.
The Mountain region is also very positively correlated with oil (some of
its states -suchas Wyoming -arealso major oil producers). The negative
correlation between its relative income and the real value of the DOLLAR is
significant at the 8% level. Finally, the Pacific region is really
disappointing.The adjusted R2 is really low and none of the variables is
significant.We have tried to eliminate the smaller states (in particular
Alaska and Hawaii) but the problem does not seem to come from any of them,
14but rather, from California. If instead of relative income we regress
relative taxes on relative unemployment rates, the coefficients for PAC are
very similar to the other regions. This leads us tothink that there could
be some problem with the Californian income data.In the absence of further
work, we should look at the Pacific results with some skepticism.
Relative Taxes Equations.
We can now proceed to estimate the relative tax and transfers equations
(2.4)' and (2.5)'. The results for the tax equations are displayed in Table
3. Each regression has been estimated by three different methods.Columns
one and two refer to simple OLS estimates. The first column shows the
coefficient and its standard error (the constant and time trend which have
been included in the regression are not reported separately15). The second
column reports the adjusted R2 and standard error of the regression. Hence,
the OLS estimate of for New England is 1.275 (s.e.-..0539) the R2 is .98
and the standard error of the regression is .009.
Note that the coefficients for the relative income variable
reported in Table 3 fluctuates around1.3516.The largest OLS estimate
corresponds to the South Atlantic (SATL) region TX1738 (s.e.—.146)- and
the smallest is the Rocky Mountains with TX1•254 (s.e.—.1566).Similar
numbers apply for the I.V. and S.U.R. estimates.
The coefficients reported in columns 3 and 4 refer to the Instrumental
Variables regressions.As we argued previously, the reason for using this
method is the possible existence of simultaneity bias since higher relative
tax rates may reduce relative regional income. Notice that the estimates of
TX are very similar to ones reported for OLS regressions.
Finally in columns 5 and 6 we allow for the regional shocks to relative
taxes u to be correlated across regions.In order to allow for that we
estimate all the regions at the same time in a seemingly unrelated regression
estimation system (S.U.R.). Again the estimates are not very different from
the OLS ones, suggesting that the correlation of error terms across equations
may not be that important.
We are now interested in testing the hypothesis of similar TX
coefficients across regions. If, as we have conjectured, the elasticity
coefficient TX reflects mostly the progressivity of the Federal Tax System,
15we should expect these coefficients to be constant across regions.In the
last six rows of Table 3 we report the coefficients when all regions are
constrained to be equal. We constrained OLS coefficient is 1.333
(s.e.—.0277). The test for equality of coefficients across regions can
barely be rejected at the 5% level (p-value—.044).The restricted IV
coefficient is 1.361 (s,e.—.0321) and the test for equality across regions
cannot be rejected at the 5% level (p-value—.076). The constrained S.IJ.R.
coefficient is 1.335 (s.e.—.0233) and the test for equality across regions
cannot be rejected at the 5% level (p-value—.l77).
The last three rows of Table 3 report the restricted Tx coefficients
when we estimate the system of regions correcting for heteroscedasticity.
The weighting method employed gives more weight to the regions whose standard
error of the regression (which is reported in Table 3) is smaller. Note that
constrained weighted OLS coefficient is 1.275 (s.e.—.0492) and p-value .05,
the constrained Weighted I.V. Tx coefficient is 1.360 (s.e.—.03l8), and the
constrained weighted S.IJ.R. coefficient is 1.335 (s.e.—.0233). We also
estimated unconstrained weighted systems which allows us to test the
hypothesis of equality of the TX coefficients across regions. We find that
we cannot reject the hypothesis of regional equality at the 5% level in any
of the three cases.
In summary, the estimated TX coefficient fluctuates around 1.35 and we
cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal across regions.This
implies that, holding constant the aggregate US variables and adjusting for
whatever factors affect the long-run movements in regional taxes, a 1 percent
increase in a region's income increases its federal tax payments by 1.35
percent (statistically significantly larger than one).Since there is no
"intentional" reduction in tax rates when a region suffers an adverse shock,
these findings just reflect the progressive nature of the US tax system.
A simple numerical example will further clarify what the numbers found
mean. Consider an economy with an average tax rate of 20% (the average tax
rate for our U.S. regions can be calculated to be around 20% from Table 5).
Suppose further that the average marginal tax rate is about 3Ø%l7 The TX
coefficient for this economy (which the ratio of marginal to average tax
rates) would be exactly 1.5. If the average marginal tax rate were 27%, the
coefficient would be 1.35. Hence, our estimates are exactly in the ball
park.
16Relative Transfers Equations.
The picture for transfers (Table 4) is a bit different. We expected to
observe a negative coefficient reflecting the fact that, holding constant US
aggregate variables, an increase in regional income would reduce the
transfers received from the federal government.The O.L.S. estimates show
that, out of nine regions, six are significantly negative, one significantly
positive (MATL) and two are not statistically significantly different from
zero (one positive point estimate corresponding to ESC, and one negative,
corresponding to WSC). The Restricted OLS estimate is -.181(s.e.—.0409) but
the equality of coefficients across regions can be rejected at the 5%
level (p-value—.000). The instrumental variables estimates reported in
columns three and four are very similar to the OLS ones (which reflects the
fact that we are estimating the relative income regressions in Table 2 with
high precision). The restricted estimate is -.171 (s.e.—.0458) and can be
rejected to be equal across regions at the 5% level (p-value—.000).
The results corresponding to the S.U.R. system are reported in columns 5
and 6 of Table 4.The restricted S.U.R. estimate is a bit higher than the
OLS one although not significantly so (s.e.—.0217)).
The results for the weighted restricted systems are reported in the last
three rows of Table 4.The weighted OLS estimate is -.327 (s.e.—.0424).
This point estimate is just a weighted average of the OLS estimates above,
where the weights are the standard errors of the OLS equations. Notice that,
because the regions with positive OLS estimate have relatively high
standard errors, the restricted weighted OLS estimate is higher than the
unweighted one (where all regions receive the same weight).
Something similar happens with the IV regressions. Because the regions
that had positive IV estimates had high standard errors, the weighted
estimate is much higher than the unweighted one.
Finally, the results for the weighted SUR system are surprising. When we
18
estimated the unconstrained weighted system (not reported in the Table) we
found that ALL the point estimates where negative and significant!. The
constrained estimate is -.226(s.e.—.021) and the equality across regions
cannot be rejected the 5% level (p-value—.l).The better estimates of
when we use a weighted S.U.R. system is probably due to the cross equation
17interaction of error terms being relatively important for the transfers
equations.
Summarizing, the relative transfer coefficients for a system of
nine U.S. regions display some instability if they are estimated giving equal
weight to all regions.If we correct for heteroscedasticity, however, the
coefficients are much more stable. The restricted unweighted numbers
fluctuate around -.20while the restricted weighted 's move around -.30.
The apparent instability of the TR coefficients is not surprising since,
unlike taxes,the federal transfer system in the U.S. is not really set as an
automatic reaction to personal income.
(5) CALCULATING THE FEDERAL IMPACT ON DISPOSABLE INCOME.
Thecoefficient estimated in Section 4 tell us by what percentage the
relative taxes and transfers of region i increase when there is a one percent
increase in that region's relative income. Looking back to equation (2.1),
we want to ask now, how many cents the federal government actually absorbs
when there is a one dollar shock to the relative per capita income of a
region. To do so we can evaluate the estimated elasticities at the average
income, tax and transfers. When average income in region i increases by one
dollar, the average tax payment increase by ATx_Txi*TXj/Yj and the average
transfer falls by ATR_TR*TRi/Yi, where is the average tax rate and
TR1/Y1 is the average transfer for that region. The final disposable income
for region I increases by AlATx+.ATR cents after a one dollar shock to that
region's income.
In Table 6 we use the estimated coefficients from Tables 3 and 4 to
calculate the corresponding A's.The first few columns use the restricted
estimates. The rows labeled OLS, IV, and SUR display the A's corresponding
to the restricted OLS, IV and SUR estimates of Tables 3 and 4.The rows
labeled WOLS, WIV, and WSUR report the A's corresponding to the restricted
weighted OLS, IV, and SUR estimates of Tables 3 and 4.The numbers in
parenthesis refer to the A's that correspond to two standard deviations away
from the point estimates of .Forinstance, the restricted OLS numbers
suggest that when a typical region in the U.S. suffers a one dollar adverse
shock to its personal income, its average federal tax payments reduce by
something between 33 and 35 cents (with a point estimate of 34 cents), its
18transfers increase by somewhere between 2 and 5 cents (with a point estimate
of 3 cents) so that the disposable income falls by something between 59 and
65 cents (with a point estimate of 62 cents).
Notice that the results for ATX are very stable across Table 6 and they
move between 34 and 37 cents to the dollar.This stability is due to the
stability of the coefficients in Table 3.The results for ATR when we
use the weighted estimates are a bit larger than the ones we get by using the
unweighted ones: the unweighted ATR are in the neighborhood of -.03while the
weighted ones fluctuate around -.06.Correspondingly the unweighted overall
A's move around .62 for the unweighted estimates and around .60 for the
weighted ones.
The second half of Table 6 shows the A estimates for each of the nine
regions. Notice that the estimated ATXs are extremely stable (except for
the Pacific region). This again is due to our earlier finding that the TX
coefficients are very stable across regions. The average tax response to a
dollar shock is 34 cents.The estimated ATR fluctuate a lot more across
regions, and therefore, so do the overall A's. The average transfer response
to a dollar regional shock is 8 cents. The corresponding average TOTAL
response to a dollar regional shock is 58 cents. Notice that these results
are not very far from the ones we got using the restricted estimates.
Taken as a whole, Table 6 suggests that when the average region suffers a
one dollar adverse shock to its personal income, its federal tax payments are
reduced by something between 33 and 37 cents, the transfers received from the
federal government increase by somewhere between one and eight cents so the
final disposable income falls by only 56 to 65 cents. Hence, the fraction of
the initial shock that is absorbed by the federal fiscal system is between
one third and one half. Most of the action comes from the tax side which
probably reflects the progressive nature of the U.S. Federal Tax system.
(6) FINAL REMARKS.
We have argued that the U.S. can be viewed as a set of regions tied by an
"irrevocably fixed ER'and that this ER arrangement seems to work
effectively. One of the reasons for this reasonably efficient system could
be that the Fiscal Federalist system absorbs a substantial fraction of
interregional shocks.This reduces the need for nominal exchange rate
realignments.
19The existence of this Federal Fiscal system does not mean that there are
no interregional adjustments to be made but, rather, that they are made
without devaluations (or major pressures on the one-to-one fixed parities)
and without extraordinary recessions.
We tried to estimate empirically the effects of such a Fiscal Federalist
system and we found that a one dollar reduction in a region's per capita
income triggered a decrease in federal taxes in the neighborhood of 34 cents
and an increase in federal transfers of about 6 cents. The final reduction
in disposable per capita income was, therefore, of only 60 cents. That is,
between one third and one half of the original one dollar shock is absorbed
by the Federal Government.
The much larger reaction of taxes than transfers to these regional
imbalances reflects that the main mechanism at work is the progressive
federal income tax system which in turn reflects that the stabilization
process is automatic rather than discretionary. Our estimates do not include
the large one time transfers that occur when there are large one time
disasters (such as the S&L crises and the huge transfers from the U.S. to the
few states involved). Hence, we are underestimating the role of the Federal
Government as a partial insurer against regional shocks.
Some economists may want to argue that this regional insurance scheme
provided by the federal government is one of the key reasons why the system
of fixed exchange rates within the United States has survived without major
problems. And this is a lesson to be learnt by the proponents of a unified
European currency:the creation of a unified currency without a federal
insurance scheme, could very well lead the project to an eventual failure.
On the other hand, it could be (rightly) argued that Europe already has
a Federal System of the type proposed here, insofar as there are European
Community Taxes. Some simple calculations based on rough estimates show that
this is close to negligible: the average VAT tax rate (as a ratio of GDP)
for members of the EEC is of the order of .5%.Let us assume that the
average and marginal tax rates are roughly similar (that is let us assume
that tax rate is always constant). This would yield a TX equal to one. The
corresponding ATX would then be about .005. That is, if a European Region or
Country suffers a one dollar adverse shock, its tax payments to the European
Community will be reduced by half a cent. This contrasts with the 34 cents
we found for the United States. Thus, European Fiscal Federalism has a long
20way to go.
21TABLE 1 Us CENSUS REGIONS
1) New England (NENG): CT, ME, MA, NH, RI and VT.
2) Middle Atlantic (MATL): NJ, NY and PA.
3) South Atlantic (SATL): DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA and WV.
4) East North Central (ENC): IL, IN, MI, OH and WI.
5) East South Central (ESC): AL, KY. MS and TN.
6) West North Central (WNC): IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND and SD.
7) West South Central (WSC): AR, LA, OK and TX.
8) Mountains (MTN): AZ, GO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT and WY.
9) Pacific (PAC): AK, CA, HI, OR and WA.
22TABLE 2 INSTRUMENTS REGRESSIONS
RHS VARIABLES
REGIONS C TIME DON? ROIL? DOLLAR R2BAR F-stat
NENG -.225 .020 -.435 -.002 .00099 .90 42.5
(-4.19) (10.5) (-2.42) (-2.97) (5.49)
MATL -.078 .009 -.373 -.001 .0007 .8424.14
(-2.33) (7.28)(-3.34) (-3.36) (5.85)
SATL -.140 .006 -.071 -.0008 .0003 .65 9.01
(-3.68) (4.53) (-.60) (-2.17) (2.26)
ENC .262 -.012 .322 -.0008 -.0007 .9354.22
(8.91) <-11.9) (3.29) (-2.42) (-7.22)
ESC -.13 - .007 .273 .00007 -.0006 .8220.38
(-5.70) (-7.67) (3.43) (0.26) (-7.21)
WNC .118 -.006 .058 -.000001 - .0006 .66 9.21
(2.88)(-4.17) (.96) (-.34) (-3.83)
WSC -.219.0003 .228 .0047 .00002 .79 17.15
(-2.72) (.12) (.84) (5.58) (.08)
MTN -.027 -.005 .150 .0017 -.0002 .7917.32
(-.87)(-4.62) (1.47) (5.30) (-1.89)
PAC .134 -.001 -.020 .0005 .-.00012.37 3.35
(4.07) (-.85) (-.18) (1.50) (-1.15)
Note: The dependent variable is per capita real income of each region
relative to the US total.The variable TIME is a time dummy.DCNP is the
growth rate of overall US GNP. ROIL? is the oil price in real terms. Dollar
is the real value of the US dollar (weighted average). The numbers in
parenthesis are t-statistics. See Table 1 for regional definitions. Sample
period 1970 to 1988.
23TABLE 3:RELATIVE TAXES VERSUS RELATIVE INCOME






NENG 1.275(.98) 1.280(.98) 1.233(.98)
(.0539) (.0090](.0580) (.0089)(.0358) [.00911
MATL 1.391 (.95) 1.434(.95) 1.324(.95)
(.0845)[.0094] (.0908) [.0095) (.0563) [.0096)
SATL 1.738 (.89) 1.693 (.89) 1.688 (.89)
(.1462)[.0099](.1834) [.0100](.1022) [.0100)
ENC 1.370(.97) 1.403(.97) 1.501(.96)
(.0938)(.0078] (.1030) (.0078) (.0730) [.00831
ESC 1.379(.78) 1.336(.78) 1.355(.78)
(.1907)(.0141] (.2057) [.0141] (.1328) [.0141)
WNC 1.591(.62) 1.694(.62) 1.658(.62)
(.2948)[.0225] (.3443) [.0226) (.2033) [.0225)
WSC 1.323(.98) 1.375(.98) 1.292(.98)
(.0537)(.01083 (.0623) (.0111] (.0414) [.0109)
MTN 1.254(.80) 1.260(.80) 1.174(.80)
(.1566)[.0134) (.1718) [.0134] (.1046) (.0135)
PAC .535 (.37) .261 (.34) .6152 (.36)
(.3315) [.0166] (.5220) (.0169] (.1920) (.0166]
RESTRICTED(1)1.333 -- 1.361 -- 1.335
(.0277) (.0321) (.0233)
P-VALUE .05 .08 .187
RESTRICTED (2)1.275 -- 1.360-- 1.335
(.0492) (.0318) (.0233)
P-VALUE .05 .08 .05
Notes to Table 3:The left hand side of these regressions are the logs of
real relative taxes described in the text. The Equations have been estimated
with a time trend and a constant, not showed separately. The OLS estimates
are reported in columns one and two. Each group of four numbers crresponds
tothe coefficientand its standard error, theadjustedR and the
standarderror of the regression.The restricted (1) systems have been
estimated with individual constants and time trends. The p-value corresponds
24to the test of equality of coefficients across regions. The likelihood ratio
statistic follows a chi-square distribution with 8 degrees of freedom. The
restricted (2) corrects for heteroscedasticity and allows each region to have
its ownvarianceof the error term. The middle two columns reproduce the OLS
estimatesusing instruments reported in Table 2.The last two columns refer
to Seemingly Unrelated regressions were the errors are allowed to be
correlated across equations. The sample period is 1970-1988.
25- .181 -- -.171
(.0409) (.0458)
.00 .00
-.327 -- - .306
(.0424) (.0472)
.00 .00













































































































































Notes to Table 4:The dependent variable is the log of the real relative
transfers from the Federal Government. See also Notes to Table 3.
26TABLE 5: AVERAGE REAL INCOME, TAXES, TRANSFERS AND DISPOSABLE INCOME
REGIONS AVG. YAVG. TX AVG.TR AVG. YD
NENG 10960 2914 1917 9963
MATL 10879 2936 2160 10056
SATL 9580 2389 1746 8937
ENC 10282 2712 1680 9250
ESC 7602 1880 1680 7398
WNC 9790 2446 1707 9051
WSC 9162 2412 1523 8273
MTN 9470 2330 1652 8792
PAC 11336 2839 2026 10523
US 10094 2607 1811 9138
Note to Table 5: The sources of the data are explained in Section 3 in the
Text. The Tax variable has been adjusted for the missing Corporate Taxes and
indirect taxes and custom duties which, as discussed in the text, represent
about 20% of federal taxes over the sample period considered.
27TABLE 6: CHANGES IN TAXES AND TRANSFERS DUE TO A 1 DOLLAR SHOCK TO INCOME
METHOD ATX dollars ATR dollars AIATR+ATX dollars
OLS .34 -.03 .62
.35,.33) (- .05. -.02) (.59,.65)
IV .35 -.03 .62
(.36,.34) (-.05.-.01) (.58,.60)
SUR .34 -.03 .62
.36,.33) (-.04. -.03) (.60,.64)
WOLS .33 -.06 .61
(.35,.30) (- .07. -.04) (.57,.65)
WIV .35 -.06 .59
(.37,.33) (- .07. -.03) (.56,.63)
WSUR .34 -.05 .61
(.36,.33) (- .06.-.04) (.59,.63)
INDIVIDUAL REGIONS ESTIMATES OF A (ols)
NENG .34 -.04 .62
MATL .38 .05 .67
SATL .43 -.23 .38
ENC .36 -.06 .58
ESC .34 .04 .69
WNC .40 -.10 .50
WSC .35 -.00 .65
MTN .31 -.14 .55
PAC .13 -.25 .62
AVERAGE .34 -.08 .58
Note to Table 6: A,. measures the fall in federal taxes that follow a one
dollar reduction in a region's total income (ATh_Tx*TX/Y). Thus, .34 means
that when a region's income falls by one dollar, the tax payments from that
region to the Federal Government go down by 34 cents.ATR measures the
increase in transfers from the Federal Government that follow a one dollar
reduction in a state's income per capita (ATR_TR*TR/Y). Thus -.06 means
that when a region's income per capita falls by one dollar, transfers from
the Federal Government to that region increase by 6 cents.
The first few rows display the A's associated with the restricted fl's
from Tables 3 and 4.OLS, IV and SUR correspond to the restricted OLS,
Instrumental Variables and SUR systems. WOLS, WIV and WSUR correspond to the
restricted weighted OLS, IV and SUR systems.In parenthesis the A's
28associated with two standard deviations from the corresponding point estimate
for fi.
Thelast few rows display the regional Aa corresponding to the
unrestricted unweighted IV systems. The average is the unweighted average of
all the As above.
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32Endnotes
See Hartland (1949) Lerner (1951) ,Meade(1957)
2 The phrase "optimum currency area" was coined by Mundell in his classic
(1961) paper.
John Stuart Mill. "Principles of political economy" vol. II, New York
1894, page. 176.
Although they did not use the phrase "optimum currency area" the concept
of unique currency for regions with high labor mobility was already outlined
by both Lerner (1951) and Meade (1957).
From a Keynesian perspective therefore, the question of the appropriate
exchange rate regime cannot really be separated from the debate question the
importance and causes of nominal rigidities.Of course the existence of
nominal rigidities is at the very heart of the current macroeconomic debate.
See Blanchard (1990) for a survey.
6 Other criteria mentioned in the literature are "the degree of openness"
(if marginal propensity to import, is very high, a small decrease in income
in A and a small increase in B will restore equilibrium); the size of
transaction costs (a unique currency reduces the transaction Costs and
accounting costs); the extent of financial market integration (high capital
mobility would facilitate borrowing and lending; of course that would not
help with a permanent shift in preferences but it would certainly bevery
important if the perturbations were temporary). We will not discuss them
because we think that (at least in 1992) Europe will satisfy the two
requirements
Finally, some economists (Kenen 1969), argue that open economies should
have fixed ER only if they have a variety of exports. If an economy exports
only one good, then a single shock may require a major real adjustment.
33The debate over fixed versus flexible ER does not stop in the analysis
of "what kind of shocks are you more likely to suffer". Some of the current
debatestressesthe "disciplinary" factorsof havingfixed ER
(Giavazzi-Pagano (1988), Giavazzi-Giovannini (1988) and Canzoneri-Henderson
(1989)). These researchers use a Barro-Gordon (1983) typeofmodel to stress
that the existence of fixed ER increases the anti-inflationary reputation of
a single government and, therefore, reduces the real costs of an deflationary
policy. For a criticism see Obstfeld (1988).
8 The way this problem has been handled up to now in the EMS has been
through devaluations. There have been 11 episodes of realignment in the 10
years of EMS existence (Giavazzi 1989).
Kenen (1969) was the first to use this kind of argument.
10Hartland (1949) analyzes the implicit interregional transfers within the
US. She looked at the treasury fund movements from industrialized to
agricultural regions in response to the government policy of supporting farm
prices in the 1930's. She concludes that "the most important determinant in
the maintenance of regional balance of payments equilibria in this country
has been the mobility of productive factors, especially that of capital". The
argument is that the role of the government was not to carry out the actual
transfers but to facilitate private capital movements. See also the Reply by
Fels (1950) and Hartland (1950).
The issue of convergence across U.S. states and European regions is
studied in Sala-i-Martin (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991a and b).
Sala-i-Martin (1990) also studies the role of the U.S. Federal Government in
promoting regional convergence.
12See Eichengreen (1991) for a discussion of this topic.
13An even better division would be the "Federal Reserve District" one,
which involves 12 Federal Reserve Districts. The tax and transfers
coefficients we estimate here, however, are not sensitive to the choice of
region. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1991) use 12 Federal Reserve regions in
a paper that studies the interplay between money and output in a system of
irrevocably fixed exchanges rates.
3414The missing proportion is a little larger for the beginning of the
sample: about 25%. The income tax receipts have remained more or less
constant over the sample.
All the systems allow for each region to have its own constant and time
trend.
16The Pacific region is once again an exception with TX•535 (s.e.—3315).
Its large standard error, however, implies (as we will see in a second) that
its OLS estimate is not significantly different from the rest since we cannot
reject the hypothesis of equality of across regions.
17The average marginal tax rate in the United States has fluctuated over
the sample. It was 27% in 1970 and progressively increased until it reached
a maximum of 38% in 1981. The Reagan tax cuts brought it back down to 34% by
1985. See Barro (1990) for a discussion of these numbers.
18The results where the following NENG—-.329 (s.e.—.052), SATL—-.202
(s.e.—.034),MATL—-.404 (s.e.-..04l),ENC—-.1l7(s.e.—.032),ESC—-.770
(s.e.—.063), WNC—-.480 (s.e.—.030), WSC—-.225 (s.e.—.037), MTN—-.210 (.056),
PAC—- .378 (s.e.—.036)
35